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   _______________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________________ 
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case requires us to decide the following difficult 
question:  To what extent may fiduciaries of Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) be held liable under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) for investing solely in 
employer common stock, when both Congress and the terms of the 
ESOP provide that the primary purpose of the plan is to invest in 
the employer's securities.  The district court held that 
fiduciaries cannot be liable in such cases, and therefore it 
granted the fiduciaries' motion for summary judgment.  Because we 
conclude that in limited circumstances, ESOP fiduciaries can be 
liable under ERISA for continuing to invest in employer stock 
according to the plan's direction, we will vacate the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the plan 
fiduciaries and will remand the case to the district court for 
further proceedings.  In this opinion we will refer to the 
plaintiff-appellant Charles Moench, a plan beneficiary, as 
"Moench," and the defendants-appellees, the Plan Committee, the 
fiduciaries with investment responsibilities, singularly as the 
"Committee." 
 
I.  Introduction 
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A.  Statewide's Demise 
 Statewide Bancorp was a bank holding company with its 
principal office in Toms River, New Jersey.  During the time 
relevant to this appeal, it operated through two wholly owned 
subsidiaries, The First National Bank of Toms River, New Jersey 
(FNBTR), and The First National Bank of New Jersey/Salem County. 
 Statewide began experiencing financial difficulties in 
1989.  "Between July 1989 and December 1989, the market value of 
Statewide Bancorp common stock fell from $18.25 per share to 
$9.50 per share."  Dist. Ct. op. at 2.  During the next year, the 
price fell even more precipitously -- to $6.00 per share in July 
1990, to $2.25 per share in December, and finally to less than 25 
cents per share in May 1991.  During this period -- from 1989 
through 1991 -- federal regulatory authorities repeatedly 
expressed concern to Statewide's Board of Directors over problems 
with Statewide's portfolio and financial condition.  On July 31, 
1989, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
informed the Statewide Board that "[c]ompliance management in the 
two subsidiary banks was found to be satisfactory in virtually 
all areas."  Letter of July 31, 1989 at Expanded Appendix (EA) 
606.0  Nevertheless, the OCC letter indicated that "[v]iolations 
                                                           
0We cite the appendix as "app.," the supplemental appendix as 
"SA" and the expanded appendix as "EA."  There is an expanded 
appendix because the Committee made a motion which Moench opposed 
to expand the appendix to include materials which were not before 
the district court.  Ordinarily we would have denied the motion. 
Here, however, a significant portion of the expanded appendix 
consists of actual copies of documents that were summarized to 
the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 1006.  Rule 1006 
states that "[t]he contents of voluminous writings . . . which 
cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the 
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of law and regulation were found across a number of areas in the 
subsidiary banks [and] [w]hile management has shown a commitment 
to promptly correct all violations, the need to develop in 
certain cases and otherwise improve policies and procedures is 
clearly evident."  Id.  A March 1990 report of an off-site review 
of FNBTR revealed "lack of depth and quality of management, 
unsafe and unsound credit practices, the resulting rapid 
deterioration in the quality of the loan portfolio, unreliable 
regulatory and management reports on loans, the inadequacy of the 
Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses, and the adverse impact of 
asset quality upon earnings and capital adequacy."  EA 690. 
Ultimately, on May 22, 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation took control of FNBTR and on May 23, 1991, Statewide 
filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
 
B.  Statewide's ESOP Plan 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
form of a chart, summary, or calculation," provided that "[t]he 
originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for examination 
[and t]he court may order that they be produced in court."  For 
all practical purposes, then, these actual documents were before 
the district court, though the court did not feel a need to 
examine them.  It seems to us that when a party relies on a Rule 
1006 summary to support its position on an appeal, at least when, 
as here, the appellate court exercises de novo review over the 
district court decision, the appellate court similarly may 
examine the actual documents.  Therefore, we will grant the 
Committee's motion to expand the appendix.  We note, though, that 
we cite to the expanded appendix only to make clear the factual 
underpinnings of this appeal, and whenever possible, we include 
parallel citations to similar propositions in the appendix or the 
supplemental appendix. 
6 
 This case involves not so much Statewide's demise but 
the fate during the period of its decline of funds invested in 
its ESOP.  Beginning on January 1, 1986, Statewide offered its 
employees the opportunity to participate in the ESOP, which was 
designed to invest primarily in Statewide common stock.  See 
Summary Plan Description at app. 174.  The ESOP named various 
entities and gave them specific administrative and fiduciary 
duties.  First, an ESOP Committee was set up "to administer the 
Plan."  The Statewide Bancorp Employee Stock Ownership Plan Art. 
10.1 at EA 451; app. 150 (Trust Agreement); SA 306-07 (Summary 
Plan Description).  The plan provided that the Committee "shall 
adopt rules for the conduct of its business and administration of 
the Plan as it considers desirable, provided they do not conflict 
with the Plan."  EA 451 (Plan, Art. 10.2); SA 307 (Summary Plan 
Description).  The documents authorized the Committee to 
"construe the Plan, correct defects, supply omissions or 
reconcile inconsistencies to the extent necessary to effectuate 
the Plan, and such action shall be conclusive."  EA 451 (Plan, 
Art. 10.4); SA 298a-299, 307 (Summary Plan Description).  To 
allow the Committee fully and adequately to perform its duties, 
the plan authorized it to "contract for legal, actuarial, 
investment management . . . and other services to carry out the 
Plan."  EA 451 (Plan, Art. 10.3); App. 150 (Trust Agreement); SA 
307 (Summary Plan Description).  According to the Trust Agreement 
implementing the plan, the Committee: 
shall have responsibility and authority to 
control the operation and administration of 
the Plan in accordance with the terms of the 
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Plan and of this Agreement, including . . . 
(i) establishment, in its discretion, of 
investment guidelines which shall be 
communicated to the Trustee in writing. 
 
Trust Agreement Art. 7.2 at app. 150-51.  The Trustee of the plan 
had "exclusive responsibility for the control and management of 
the assets of the Trust Fund," Trust Agreement at app. 150.   
 The plan provided that:  
Except as otherwise provided in this Section, 
the Trustee shall invest the Fund as directed 
by the Committee.  Generally, within 30 days 
of receipt, the Trustee shall invest all 
contributions received under the terms of the 
plan not applied to the repayment of 
principal and interest on any Acquisition 
Loan in ESOP stock, except that the Trustee 
shall be authorized to invest a portion of 
the contributions received in other 
securities as a reserve for the payment of 
administrative expenses and cash 
distributions. 
 
App. 148 (ESOP Plan, Amended and Restated Effective Jan. 1, 
1989).  The plan documents gave Statewide, as the plan sponsor, 
"the authority and responsibility for . . .  the design of the 
Plan, including the right to amend the Plan."  Trust Agreement 
Art. 7.3 at app. 151.  The plan documents also required Statewide 
to exercise "all fiduciary functions provided in the Plan or in 
this [Trust] Agreement or necessary to the operation of the Plan 
except such functions as are assigned to other fiduciaries 
pursuant to the Plan or this Agreement."  Id. 
 The ESOP created and governed by these documents worked 
as follows:  Employees became eligible to participate in the plan 
after one year of service.  Employees who chose to participate 
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had their contribution deducted from their salary; the employer 
then would match up to 50% of the employee's voluntary 
contribution.  The plan also provided for an Employer Profit 
Sharing Contribution, to be made at the end of the Plan year, 
though only at the option of the Statewide Board of Directors. 
 Throughout the relevant time period, the Committee 
regularly invested the ESOP fund in Statewide common stock, 
despite the continual and precipitous drop in its price and 
despite the Committee's knowledge of Statewide's precarious 
condition by virtue of the members' status as directors.  Yet the 
record reflects that several Statewide insiders began to have 
misgivings regarding the investment.  Jack Breda, FNBTR's 
Director of Personnel, testified that when the price of Statewide 
stock started to drop, he began thinking it would be 
inappropriate to continue such investments.  App. 119.  He 
further testified that he relayed to Statewide's chief executive 
officer (CEO) the pension committee's recommendation that "we 
[should] look for other vehicles to invest money in," and that 
the CEO should relay that advice to the executive committee or 
the Board of Directors.  App. 120.  Apparently, the CEO reported 
back that the Board of Directors had rejected the proposal 
because "the original intent of the plan was to invest [in] 
Statewide Bancorp stock."  App. 120.  On May 13, 1991, C.T. 
Bjorklund, Statewide's Benefits and Compensation Manager, wrote a 
memorandum to Breda stating the following: 
The Statewide [ESOP] permits employees to 
voluntarily suspend contributions at any time 
during the year.  The Bank can also cease 
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contributions at any time without notice. 
Such discontinuance would not trigger a full 
vesting situation.  Only a complete plan 
termination would cause immediate full 
vesting of all participants. 
Although the ESOP gives us a beginning bias 
to hold Statewide Stock and the plan says 
that amounts contributed are to be invested 
in company stock, the trustee has the power 
to invest in other vehicles.  Potentially the 
trustee should consider investing in short 
term money market instruments with current 
and future contributions. 
 
App. 90.  A notation from Breda to Bjorklund at the bottom of the 
memorandum states "I have been notified by [the CEO] on 5/21/91 
that the Executive Committee of Statewide Bancorp voted not to 
accept the revised or restated ESOP plan . . . ."  App. 90. 
 Kevin William Bless, Assistant Vice President and 
Senior Pension Trust Officer of FNBTR testified that as 
Statewide's stock price fell, FNBTR's Trust Division held general 
discussions "about the permissibility of investing moneys in ESOP 
in a stock that had potential problems."  App. 136.  The Trust 
Division decided that since the Committee's knowledge of 
Statewide's precarious state was based on confidential reports 
issued by the OCC, it would be inappropriate to use the 
information in making investment decisions.  Thus, Bless 
testified that "the nature of the ESOP dictated that we invest 
solely in [Statewide] securities absent any public knowledge that 
it would be an imprudent investment."  App. 139.  In these 
discussions, then, the ESOP was not seen as absolutely requiring 
investment in Statewide stock.  Indeed, in early 1991 the Trustee 
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decided to cease investing in Statewide stock and to place all of 
the ESOP assets in money market accounts. 
 The Committee has not directed our attention to 
anything in the record to suggest that while the stock price was 
falling and the OCC was issuing its warning letters, the 
Committee met to discuss any possible effects on the ESOP or any 
actions that it should take and we have not found any indication 
that there was such a meeting.  Moreover, although on June 12, 
1990, investors filed a class action securities fraud suit 
against Statewide and certain of its directors (the Lerner 
action), which eventually settled for $3,200,000.00, the 
Committee did not participate on behalf of the ESOP and therefore 
the ESOP did not share in the settlement.  Ultimately, 
Statewide's descent rendered the employees' ESOP accounts 
virtually worthless. 
 
C.  The Litigation 
 On November 16, 1992, Moench, a former Statewide 
employee who participated in the ESOP plan, brought this action 
against the members of the Committee.  These defendants were also 
members of Statewide's Board of Directors.  However, he did not 
sue either the Trustee or the plan sponsor, Statewide.  In his 
first complaint, he charged the Committee with breaching its 
fiduciary duties under ERISA and pleaded a securities fraud suit 
on behalf of the ESOP.  Moench moved to certify the class and the 
Committee moved to dismiss the complaint.  In an August 17, 1993 
opinion and order (entered four days later), the district court 
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dismissed a count Moench advanced that the plan should have been 
amended or terminated because "[r]egardless of whether 
terminating or modifying the Plan would have proved to be prudent 
conduct, such action is not that which is encompassed within a 
director's fiduciary duties under ERISA."  Op. at SA 256 (citing 
Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1161 (3d Cir. 
1990)).  The court denied the motion to dismiss the remaining 
ERISA counts but dismissed the securities fraud count without 
prejudice for failure to plead with the particularity required by 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.  The court requested further briefing on 
Moench's class certification motion. Op. at 4-5. 
 Moench responded by filing an amended complaint, 
principally under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), for breach of fiduciary 
duty under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104 and 1109.  Count 1 charged the 
Committee with breaching its fiduciary obligations under ERISA; 
Count 2 sought to hold the members of the Committee liable for 
breaches of their co-fiduciaries; Count 3 charged it with failing 
to disclose and misrepresenting pertinent information concerning 
Statewide's condition, that affected employees' decision to 
invest in the ESOP;  Count 4 charged breaches of fiduciary duties 
on behalf of the ESOP, including failing to file a securities 
fraud action on behalf of the plan; and Count 5 plead on behalf 
of the ESOP a securities fraud claim under 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. 
On December 20, 1993, the district court issued an order 
certifying a class as to the first three counts and allowing 
Moench to prosecute the derivative actions on behalf of the ESOP. 
 On July 18, 1994, Moench filed a motion for a partial 
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summary judgment declaring that the individual Committee members 
were fiduciaries governed by the standard of care provided in 
ERISA.  The Committee did not oppose Moench's motion, and thus it 
admitted that its members were ERISA fiduciaries.  The Committee 
nevertheless filed a cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing 
the complaint on the ground that it did not breach its ERISA 
obligations.  The district court issued an opinion and order on 
September 21, 1994, granting both motions.   
 Noting that the Committee had conceded its fiduciary 
status, the court granted Moench's motion without analysis.  The 
court then held that the Committee had no discretion under the 
terms of the plan to invest the ESOP funds in anything other than 
Statewide common stock.  And since the plan complied with ERISA, 
"[Moench] has failed to establish that [the Committee's] actions 
in directing the purchases of stock for the Plan were other than 
in accordance with the requirements of the Plan or otherwise in 
violation of ERISA."  Op. at 12.  The court found no merit in 
Moench's allegations that the Committee gave inaccurate, 
incomplete and false information about the plan.  Rather, it 
observed, "[t]he Plan specifically provides that it 'is a capital 
accumulation Plan [and therefore] . . . does not provide for a 
guaranteed benefit at retirement,'" op. at 12 (first alteration 
added), and that "the very nature of ESOP plans contemplates that 
the value and security of the employees' retirement fund will 
necessarily fluctuate with the fortunes of the employer because 
ESOPs invest primarily in employer stock."  Id.  Finally, the 
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court held that the statute of limitations barred Moench's 
derivative securities fraud suit.  Id. at 16. 
 Moench timely filed this appeal.  He argues that the 
district court erred in deciding that the plan documents absolved 
the Committee from any liability resulting from investing the 
ESOP funds in Statewide stock.  He also contends that the 
district court should not have dismissed his purported claim that 
the Committee violated ERISA by failing to file a securities 
fraud action on behalf of the plan.  He does not challenge the 
dismissal of the securities fraud suit, and, though he is not 
entirely clear on this point, does not appear to challenge the 
district court's conclusions concerning the Committee's alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions.  Thus, in his brief he recites 
that he appeals from the summary judgment on counts 1, 2, and 4 
but not from the summary judgment on counts 3 and 5 of the 
amended complaint.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1291.  The district court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).  We exercise plenary review over 
the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
 
II.  Discussion 
A.  Introduction:  ERISA's Broad Purpose 
 Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, "after 'almost a decade 
of studying the Nation's private pension plans' and other 
employee benefit plans."  Central States, Southeast and Southwest 
Area Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 569, 
105 S.Ct. 2833, 2839 (1985) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension 
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Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361, 100 S.Ct. 1723, 1726 
(1980)).  Noting the rapid growth of such plans, Congress set out 
to "'assur[e] the equitable character of [employee benefit plans] 
and their financial soundness.'"  Central States, 472 U.S. at 
570, 105 S.Ct. at 2840 (quoting statute) (alterations in 
original).  ERISA seeks to accomplish this goal by requiring such 
plans to name fiduciaries and by giving them strict and detailed 
duties and obligations.  Specifically, ERISA requires benefit 
plans to "provide for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly 
or severally shall have authority to control and manage the 
operation and administration of the plan."  29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) 
(1).  An ERISA fiduciary "shall discharge his duties . . . solely 
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" and must 
act "with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct 
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."  29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).  These requirements generally are 
referred to as the duties of loyalty and care, or as the "solely 
in the interest" and "prudence" requirements.  This case requires 
us to decide how these requirements apply to fiduciaries of ESOP 
plans. 
 
B.  Are Defendants Fiduciaries as to Investment Decisions? 
 Before considering the substantive questions on this 
appeal, we must address the Committee's argument that for the 
purposes of this lawsuit, dealing principally with investment 
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decisions, its members are not ERISA fiduciaries, but rather 
either the Trustee or Statewide was the fiduciary with respect to 
investments.  Under ERISA, "a person is a fiduciary with respect 
to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary 
authority or discretionary control respecting management of such 
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management 
or disposition of its assets . . . or (iii) he has any 
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan."  29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).   As 
these definitions imply, "'[f]iduciary status . . . is not an 
"all or nothing concept . . . . [A] court must ask whether a 
person is a fiduciary with respect to the particular activity in 
question."'"  Maniace  v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, N.A., 40 
F.3d 264, 267 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Kerns v. Benefit Trust 
Life Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1993)) (first alteration 
added), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1964 (1995);  American Fed'n of 
Unions Local 102 Health and Welfare Fund v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 841 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir. 
1988) ("A person is a fiduciary only with respect to those 
portions of a plan over which he exercises discretionary 
authority or control.").  The Statewide ESOP, like most benefit 
plans, names several fiduciaries and allocates duties among them. 
 The Committee's argument that it was not the fiduciary 
vis a vis investment decisions faces a procedural hurdle because 
it did not advance that position before the district court.  To 
the contrary, in its "Brief in Support of Defendants' Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment," the Committee stated the following: 
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Plaintiff has filed a motion for Summary 
Judgment on the issue of whether the 
defendants were fiduciaries.  Defendants do 
not dispute that they were fiduciaries of the 
ESOP.  However, defendants argue that they 
did not breach any of their fiduciary duties. 
 
Dist. Ct. Br. at 1.  Based on this representation, the district 
court quite naturally interpreted the Committee's admission 
consistently with the relief Moench sought in his motion.  In 
that motion, Moench sought a partial summary judgment declaring 
that the Committee members were fiduciaries vis a vis, among 
other things, investment decisions regarding the ESOP.  See 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment at 1 ("the members of the committee were given the power 
to, inter alia, . . . create investment guidelines for the ESOP, 
appoint investment mangers for the ESOP . . . .").  After all, 
that is what this case always has been about.  Thus, in the 
absence of any distinctions or qualifications drawn by the 
Committee with respect to the capacities in which its members 
were fiduciaries, the court granted Moench's motion and treated 
the Committee members as fiduciaries vis a vis investment 
decisions.   
 At the very least, then, the Committee failed to raise 
before the district court the argument that its members were not 
fiduciaries regarding investment decisions.  This omission is 
decisive for "[i]t is well established that failure to raise an 
issue in the district court constitutes a waiver of the 
argument."  American Cyanamid Co. v. Fermenta Animal Health Co., 
54 F.3d 177, 187 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Brenner v. Local 514, 
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United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 927 F.2d 1283, 
1298 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 In fact, the Committee's representation in the district 
court, when read in conjunction with the arguments it advanced in 
its district court brief, shows that it actually conceded that 
its members were fiduciaries vis a vis investment decisions.  The 
Committee did not qualify the concession it made at the outset of 
its brief.  To the contrary, in the argument section, the 
Committee contended that it "had absolutely no [discretion] 
regarding where to invest the plan's assets," br. at 8, and that 
"the [Committee] had no choice except to continue purchasing 
Statewide stock."  Br. at 16.  In other words, the Committee 
conceded that it was responsible for making investment decisions 
but argued that by complying with the ESOP provisions it complied 
with ERISA's fiduciary requirements.  Thus, the Committee is 
changing course when it now argues that either the Trustee or the 
Sponsor was the fiduciary regarding investing the ESOP assets and 
that it was simply not an ERISA fiduciary in the relevant 
capacity.  We will not permit this.  See Eichleay Corp. v. 
International Ass'n of Iron Workers, 944 F.2d 1047, 1056 n. 9 (3d 
Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 503 U.S. 915, 112 S.Ct. 1285 (1992); 
Cowgill v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 
1987).  Thus, we hold that the Committee acted in a fiduciary 
capacity regarding decisions about how to invest the ESOP 
18 
assets.0  We next turn to the district court's grant of the 
Committee's motion for summary judgment. 
 
C.  The Committee's Duties Under ERISA 
 The first issue we address is the one on which the 
district court focused -- the requirements of the Statewide ESOP 
and ESOPs generally.  This inquiry raises the following 
questions:  (1)  Did the district court err in concluding that 
the Committee was required by the plan to invest the plan assets 
in Statewide stock;  (2) If so, was the Committee nevertheless 
constrained by the nature of ESOPs themselves to invest solely in 
Statewide stock?; (3)  If the plan required the Committee to 
invest in Statewide stock, did its fiduciary responsibilities 
under ERISA nevertheless require it to ignore the provisions of 
the plan and to diversify the plan's investments? 
 
1.  The district court's decision 
 The district court concluded that the plan documents 
mandated that the Committee invest the ESOP assets solely in 
Statewide stock, and thus it granted the Committee's motion for 
summary judgment.  It appears that in reaching this result the 
court deferred to the Committee's interpretation of the plan. 
                                                           
0For the reasons set forth later in this opinion, Judge Mansmann 
agrees that the Committee acted in a fiduciary capacity regarding 
investment decisions of the ESOP assets.  She does not believe, 
however, that the Committee conceded the point since it 
maintained from the commencement of the suit that the ESOP 
documents did not grant it discretion in the investment of the 
plan's assets. 
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Specifically, it held that "[j]udicial review of the decisions of 
fiduciaries in the exercise of their powers is highly deferential 
and will be upheld unless the decisions are shown to be arbitrary 
and capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, or 
erroneous on a question of law."  Op. at 11.  Against this 
backdrop, it reasoned: 
the terms of the Plan required [the 
Committee] to invest the Plan funds in 
Statewide Bancorp Common Stock within 30 days 
after the end of the month in which the funds 
were received.  It is clear by the terms of 
the Plan that it did not afford any 
discretion in directing the investment of the 
Plan funds in any other manner. 
 
Op. at 11-12. 
 Therefore, we initially must decide the scope of a 
court's review over an ERISA fiduciary's decisions.  Moench and 
his amici argue that the district court applied an incorrect 
standard of review, as in their view, in cases not involving a 
trustee's decision to deny benefits to a particular beneficiary, 
courts do not apply the deferential arbitrary and capricious 
standard.  Rather, they contend that the courts in such cases 
apply the prudent person standard. 
 
2.  The Scope of Review Over an ERISA Fiduciary's Decisions 
 Moench relies heavily on Struble v. New Jersey Brewery 
Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1984), to 
support his argument that the arbitrary and capricious standard 
does not apply.  In that case, the plaintiff beneficiaries 
charged the defendant trustees with breaching their fiduciary 
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obligations under ERISA by failing to collect employer 
contributions to the plan and by applying surpluses to benefit 
the employers rather than the retirees.  The defendants argued 
that the court only should have asked whether their actions were 
arbitrary or capricious.   
 At that point in ERISA's history, courts routinely 
borrowed the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review 
governing claims brought under section 302(c)(5) of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, a statute that permits employer 
contributions to a welfare trust fund "only if the contributions 
are used 'for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees . . 
. .'"  Struble, 732 F.2d at 333 (citing LMRA).  After surveying 
the ERISA caselaw, we observed that "[a]lthough the courts have 
described the applicability of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard in rather overbroad language, they nonetheless have 
limited the use of the standard to cases involving personal 
claims for benefits.  In other cases they have consistently 
applied the standards set forth explicitly in ERISA."  Id.   And, 
we reasoned, there exists a qualitative difference between a 
personal claim for benefits and a contention that an ERISA 
trustee failed to act in the interest of the beneficiaries at 
all.  We explained: 
In actions by individual claimants 
challenging the trustees' denial of benefits, 
the issue is not whether the trustees have 
sacrificed the interests of the beneficiaries 
as a class in favor of some third party's 
interests, but whether the trustees have 
correctly balanced the interests of present 
claimants against the interests of future 
claimants. . . . In such circumstances it is 
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appropriate to apply the more deferential 
'arbitrary and capricious' standard to the 
trustees' decisions.  In the latter type of 
action, the gravamen of the plaintiff's 
complaint is not that the trustees have 
incorrectly balanced valid interests, but 
rather that they have sacrificed valid 
interests to advance the interests of non-
beneficiaries. 
 
Id. at 333-34.  Because in Struble "[t]he plaintiffs allege[d] 
that the Employer Trustees voted to give the . . . surplus to the 
Employers and to reduce the Employers' contributions in order to 
promote the Employers' interests rather than the retirees' 
interests," id. at 334, we held that the trustees' actions were 
subject to the prudent person standard.  We then applied a de 
novo standard of review. 
 Although the plaintiff and their amici urge the 
mechanical application of Struble here, the facts of that case 
are not directly apposite.  Struble involved a decision by an 
ERISA fiduciary to give a benefit to the employer rather than to 
the beneficiary -- the fiduciary was required to decide which of 
two classes to favor.  And a decision in favor of one class 
necessarily meant that the other class "lost," that is, could not 
share in the benefit.  When the fiduciary's alignment with the 
the employer class was added to the mix, its stark, conflicted 
position became evident.  Here, by contrast, Moench does not 
contend that the Committee's interpretation of the plan and its 
investment decisions favored non-beneficiaries at the necessary 
expense of beneficiaries. Rather, the Committee's interpretation 
of the plan and its investment decisions occurred prior to, as 
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well as during, the period in which Statewide declined 
financially.  Thus, the Committee did not engage in the kind of 
zero-sum, conflicted analysis that we looked at so warily in 
Struble.  Actually, Moench's conflict of interest allegations 
really go to the second issue raised on appeal -- that the 
Committee members' positions as Statewide directors as well as 
ESOP fiduciaries made impartial decision-making regarding whether 
to pursue an action on behalf of the ESOP impossible.  See 
typescript, infra, at 46-47.  Moreover, unlike the situation in 
Struble, the Committee's investment decision was squarely in 
keeping with the purpose of all ESOP plans. 
 While Struble does not directly control, we must 
inquire whether its reasoning properly may be expanded to the 
facts here after Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 
113, 109 S.Ct. 948 (1989), a case in which the Supreme Court 
addressed the standard of review governing claims for benefits 
under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  We turn to that case now. 
 The Firestone Court began its analysis by addressing 
ERISA decisions borrowing the LMRA standard of review.  The Court 
pointed out that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review 
under the LMRA arose in large part because the LMRA did not 
provide for judicial review of decisions of LMRA trustees.  Thus, 
the courts adopted the deferential standard of review "as a means 
of asserting jurisdiction over suits under § 186(c) by 
beneficiaries of LMRA plans who were denied benefits by 
trustees."  Id. at 109, 109 S.Ct. at 953.  ERISA, on the other 
hand, explicitly authorizes private causes of action.  Therefore, 
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"the raison d'etre for the LMRA arbitrary and capricious standard 
. . . is not present in ERISA."  Id. at 110, 109 S.Ct. at 954.   
 However, after declining to apply the LMRA caselaw, the 
Firestone Court did not assume that the strict standards of ERISA 
necessarily should be applied in a de novo fashion.  To the 
contrary, the Court proceeded to point out that "ERISA abounds 
with the language and terminology of trust law" and that "ERISA's 
legislative history confirms that the Act's fiduciary 
responsibility provisions . . . 'codif[y] and mak[e] applicable 
to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the 
evolution of the law of trusts.'"  Id. (citation omitted) 
(elipses added).  The Court previously had interpreted the 
statute and its legislative history as authorizing courts to 
develop a "'federal common law of rights and obligations under 
ERISA-regulated plans,'" id. (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56, 107 S Ct. 1549, 1558 (1987)), and in 
Firestone the Court further held that "[i]n determining the 
appropriate standard of review for actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B), 
we are guided by principles of trust law."  Id. at 111, 109 S.Ct. 
at 954. 
 After examining the common law of trusts, the Court 
concluded that the language of the trust controls the ultimate 
standard of judicial review.  Thus, "'[w]here discretion is 
conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a 
power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court except 
to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion.'"  Id. 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187 (1959)).  However, 
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where the trust agreement does not give the trustee power to 
construe uncertain provisions of the plan, or to make eligibility 
determinations, the trustee is not entitled to deference and 
courts exercise de novo review.  Id. at 111-12, 109 S.Ct. at 955. 
 Firestone's analytical framework mandates a fresh look 
at the appropriate standard of review in light of the particular 
action being challenged.  After all, Firestone seemed to require 
courts in all ERISA cases to examine the common law of trusts for 
guidance in determining the scope of review over a particular 
ERISA question.  The situation is complicated, however, by 
Firestone's caveat at its outset that "[t]he discussion which 
follows is limited to the appropriate standard of review in 
§1132(a)(1)(B) actions challenging denials of benefits based on 
plan interpretations."  Id. at 108, 109 S.Ct. at 953.  The Court 
then continued, "[w]e express no view as to the appropriate 
standard of review for actions under other remedial provisions of 
ERISA."  Id.   
 A number of courts, relying on Firestone's express 
limitation, have refused to apply the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review to ERISA cases falling outside the category of 
claims for benefits even though the fiduciary involved had 
discretionary powers.  For instance, in Ches v. Archer, 827 F. 
Supp. 159 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), the plaintiffs alleged that the plan 
administrators violated ERISA by refusing to enforce a 
contribution agreement against an employer.  The administrators 
urged that Firestone compelled application of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review, because the plan granted them 
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broad discretion in their administration of the plan.  The court, 
relying primarily on Struble, rejected the argument: 
[T]he discussion in Firestone was expressly 
limited to the appropriate standard of review 
in actions challenging denials of benefits 
based on plan interpretations, . . . and its 
holding therefore does not encompass the 
present case where the fiduciaries' failure 
to enforce the contribution payments 
agreement is challenged. . . . In evaluating 
fiduciaries' administration of ERISA plans, 
courts have typically applied the stricter, 
statutory standard of care, limiting the 
applicability of the more lenient, arbitrary 
and capricious standard only to cases where 
the legality of the trustees' benefit 
determination was at issue. 
 
Id. at 165.  More recently the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, relying in part on Ches v. Archer, interpreted Firestone 
narrowly and explicitly held that the Struble holding survived 
the Supreme Court's decision.  In that case, John Blair 
Communications, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group, Inc. 
Profit Sharing Plan, 26 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 1994), a profit sharing 
plan brought an ERISA claim against the committee charged with 
administering the plan, and alleged that by allocating certain 
surpluses as an employer contribution rather than to the 
individual beneficiaries' accounts, the committee violated its 
fiduciary obligations under ERISA.  The court "decline[d] to 
apply the arbitrary and capricious standard to the fiduciary 
conduct at issue here because this case does not involve a simple 
denial of benefits, over which the plan administrators have 
discretion."  Id. at 369.  Rather, the court held that 
"Firestone's proposition that the more lenient arbitrary and 
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capricious standard applies where the plan grants discretion to 
the administrators does not alter Struble's holding that 
decisions that improperly disregard the valid interest of 
beneficiaries in favor of third parties remain subject to the 
strict prudent standard articulated in § 404 of ERISA."  Id.  In 
reaching its decision, the court expressed concern about the 
policy implications of expanding Firestone's reach: "Any other 
rule would allow plan administrators to grant themselves broad 
discretion over all matters concerning plan administration, 
thereby eviscerating ERISA's statutory command that fiduciary 
decisions be held to a strict standard."  Id. 
 We agree with these courts that the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review allowed in Firestone should not be 
applied mechanically to all ERISA claims, and that claims 
analogous to those addressed by Struble merit de novo review. But 
that does not mean that Firestone has nothing to say about ERISA 
claims falling outside the purview of section 1132(a)(1)(B) and 
not controlled by Struble.  While the Firestone Court 
"express[ed] no view as to the appropriate standard of review for 
actions under other remedial provisions of ERISA," id. at 108, 
109 S.Ct. at 953, the Court's mode of analysis is certainly 
relevant to determine the standard of review pertaining to all 
claims filed under ERISA challenging a fiduciary's performance. 
Specifically, the Court looked to trust law in large part because 
the terms used throughout ERISA -- participant, beneficiary, 
fiduciary, trustee, fiduciary duties -- are the "language and 
terminology of trust law."  Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110, 109 S.Ct. 
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at 954.  That being the case, we believe that after Firestone, 
trust law should guide the standard of review over claims, such 
as those here, not only under section 1132(a)(1)(B) but also over 
claims filed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) based on 
violations of the fiduciary duties set forth in section 1104(a). 
After all, section 1104(a) also abounds with the language of 
trust law, and the Supreme Court previously has noted that 
"Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general 
scope of [fiduciaries'] authority and responsibility."  Central 
States, 472 U.S. at 570, 105 S.Ct. at 2840.  Indeed, in Central 
States, the Court went on to say that "[t]he manner in which 
trustee powers may be exercised . . . is further defined in the 
statute through the provision of strict standards of trustee 
conduct, also derived from the common law of trusts -- most 
prominently, a standard of loyalty and a standard of care."  Id.; 
see also Acosta v. Pacific Enter., 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 
1991) ("common law trust principles animate the fiduciary 
responsibility provisions of ERISA."). 
 Our conclusion is supported by a recent decision by the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit discussing both Firestone 
and Struble.  In that case, Mahoney v. Board of Trustees, 973 
F.2d 968 (1st Cir. 1992), the plaintiffs claimed that the 
trustees of a plan violated ERISA by increasing the size of 
retirement pensions unevenly, in a manner that "treat[ed] 
longshoremen who had already retired less favorably than those 
who were still working."  Id. at 969.  The plaintiffs, relying in 
part on Struble, contended that because several of the trustees 
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were working longshoremen, who benefitted from the trustees' 
decision, the court should apply "an especially strict standard 
of review." Id. at 970.  The court disagreed, noting that in 
determining the appropriate standard of review after Firestone, 
trust law "guides, but does not control, our decision."  Id. at 
971.  The court then reviewed ordinary principles of trust law, 
as well as cases applying common law trust principles in 
analogous situations, and concluded that even though the trustees 
arguably made a decision to benefit themselves rather than the 
plaintiff class, trust law permitted them to be beneficiaries of 
the plan.  Therefore, as long as they were making discretionary 
decisions, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review 
applied. 
3.  The Scope of Review Over the Committee's Interpretation 
 In this case, Firestone itself gives us guidance as to 
the standard of review over the Committee's interpretation of the 
plan.  The Supreme Court's analysis of trust law led it to the 
conclusion that "[a] trustee may be given power to construe 
disputed or doubtful terms, and in such circumstances the 
trustee's interpretation will not be disturbed if reasonable." 
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111, 109 S.Ct. at 954.  This conclusion is 
in accord with general principles of trust law, which provides 
that "[w]here discretion is conferred upon the trustee with 
respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject 
to control by the court, except to prevent an abuse by the 
trustee of his discretion."  Restatement (Second) of Trusts §187.  
Indeed, in Central States, the Court gave significant weight to 
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the trustees' interpretation of the trust agreement, because "the 
trust agreement explicitly provide[d] that 'any construction [of 
the agreement's provisions] adopted by the Trustees in good faith 
shall be binding upon the Union, Employees and Employers.'"  
Central States, 472 U.S. at 568, 105 S.Ct. at 2839 (first 
alteration added). 
 Here, the plan gave the Committee unfettered discretion 
to interpret its terms; it further provided that the Committee's 
interpretations are conclusive.  Thus, assuming that the 
Committee interpreted the plan, the arbitrary and capricious 
standard applies and we will disturb its interpretation only if 
its reading of the plan documents was unreasonable.0 
 In this regard, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit has enumerated a series of helpful factors to consider in 
determining whether an interpretation of a plan is reasonable: 
(1) whether the interpretation is consistent 
with the goals of the Plan; (2) whether it 
renders any language in the Plan meaningless 
or internally inconsistent; (3) whether it 
conflicts with the substantive or procedural 
requirements of the ERISA statute; (4) 
whether the [relevant entities have] 
interpreted the provision at issue 
consistently; and (5) whether the 
interpretation is contrary to the clear 
language of the Plan. 
 
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 48 
F.3d 365, 371 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Finley v. Special Agents 
                                                           
0Our result is in complete harmony with the prudent man standard 
of care obligations imposed by 29 U.S.C. § 1104 on fiduciaries, 
as our holding implicates only the standard of review of the 
conduct of a fiduciary and not the standards governing that 
conduct. 
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Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 957 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1992)).  The 
first factor clearly weighs in favor of the interpretation 
suggested by the Committee during the course of this litigation 
in both the district court and on appeal, i.e., that it was 
required without any discretion to invest in Statewide stock.  As 
the district court recognized, ESOP plans are formulated with the 
primary purpose of investing in employer securities.  That being 
the case, the Committee's interpretation is consistent with the 
purpose of the trust.  See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187 
Comment d (court should consider "the purposes of the trust" in 
determining whether trustee has abused the discretion conferred 
on him or her by the terms of the plan.).   
 However, the Committee's purported interpretation 
renders other language in the plan documents meaningless.  For 
instance, the plan documents state that assets are to be invested 
primarily in Statewide stock.  Therefore, it seems 
counterintuitive for the Committee to interpret the plan as 
requiring it to invest exclusively in Statewide stock.  More 
importantly, the history of the Trustee's investment decisions --
actually relied upon by the Committee -- belie the reasonableness 
of the Committee's interpretation.  The Committee concedes in its 
brief (apparently without realizing the consequences) that "in 
March, 1991 . . . the Trust Division voted not to invest any more 
money in Statewide's stock until the issue was clarified and 
instead held the fund in money market instruments."  Br. at 11. 
With this statement, the Committee admits that the plan has been 
interpreted -- by the entity investing the assets -- as 
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permitting the Trustee to refrain from investing the plan assets 
in Statewide stock.  Therefore, the language of the trust 
documents has not been interpreted consistently in the manner the 
Committee suggests.  Similarly, the Committee makes inconsistent 
arguments on this appeal, which make us wary of adopting its 
interpretation.  On the one hand, it argues that the plan 
documents did not permit it to invest in securities other than 
Statewide stock.  On the other, it argues that it could diversify 
the investments only when information about Statewide's impending 
collapse became public. 
 Finally, the Committee's interpretation, particularly 
in light of the ambiguous language of the plan, is inconsistent 
with ERISA inasmuch as it constrains the Committee's ability to 
act in the best interest of the beneficiaries.  Kuper v. Quantum 
Chem. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 1389, 1395 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (ESOP plan 
"must be interpreted, consistent with ERISA to provide that the . 
. . ESOP fiduciaries did possess discretion to place ESOP funds 
into investments other than [employer] stock, in the event that 
the interests of the plan participants and beneficiaries so 
required"); cf. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 228(a) ("In 
investing the funds of the trust, the trustee has a duty to the 
beneficiaries to conform to any applicable statutory provisions 
governing investment by trustees.").  Moreover, as we discuss 
more fully below, it is at odds with a fiduciary's responsibility 
under the common law of trusts, which mandates that the trustee 
in certain narrow instances must take actions at odds with how it 
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is directed generally to act.  Therefore, the Committee's 
interpretation of the plan is unreasonable and we reject it.0 
 We need not rely solely on the unreasonableness of the 
Committee's interpretation during this litigation, however, 
because the record is devoid of any evidence that the Committee 
construed the plan at all.  Thus, this is not a case implicating 
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.  The Committee 
points to nothing in the record indicating that it -- the 
Committee -- actually deliberated, discussed or interpreted the 
plan in any formal manner.  To the contrary, in support of its 
supposed interpretation, the Committee cites actions taken by the 
Pension and Benefits Committee of Statewide, which it concedes 
"was an entity separate and distinct from the Plan Committee 
comprised of the defendants," br. at 9, and actions taken by the 
"Trust Division of FNBTR, the Trustee of the Plan," br. at 10, 
which also was not the Committee in charge of construing the 
terms of the plan.  The deferential standard of review of a plan 
interpretation "is appropriate only when the trust instrument 
allows the trustee to interpret the instrument and when the 
trustee has in fact interpreted the instrument."  Trustees of 
Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare 
                                                           
0In view of our result, we are not concerned with a situation in 
which an ESOP plan in absolutely unmistakeable terms requires 
that the fiduciary invest the assets in the employer's securities 
regardless of the surrounding circumstances.  Consequently, we 
should not be understood as suggesting that there never could be 
a breach of fiduciary duty in such a case.  We similarly do not 
reach Moench's argument that if the plan directed the Committee 
to invest the funds solely in Statewide stock, ERISA nevertheless 
required the Committee to ignore the plan terms when those terms 
conflicted with its fiduciary obligations under ERISA. 
33 
Fund v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 17 F.3d 1081, 1083 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).  As the Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts § 187, comment (h) puts it: 
The court will control the trustee in the 
exercise of a power where its exercise is 
left to the judgment of the trustee and he 
fails to use his judgment.  Thus, if the 
trustee without knowledge of or inquiry into 
the relevant circumstances and merely as a 
result of his arbitrary decision or whim 
exercises or fails to exercise a power, the 
court will interpose. 
 
Here, there is no indication that the Committee actually made an 
effort to construe the plan.  In the absence of such evidence: 
'The extent of the duties and powers of a 
trustee is determined by rules of law that 
are applicable to the situation, and not the 
rules that the trustee or his attorney 
believes to be applicable, and by the terms 
of the trust as the court may interpret them, 
and not as they may be interpreted by the 
trustee or by his attorney.' 
 
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112, 109 S.Ct. at 955 (citation omitted). 
 As such, applying a de novo interpretation of the plan, 
we have no hesitation concluding that the Statewide ESOP, while 
designed with the primary purpose of investing in Statewide 
securities, did not absolutely require the Committee to invest 
exclusively in Statewide stock.0  We therefore believe that the 
district court erred in determining that the Committee had no 
latitude but to continue investing in Statewide stock. 
 The Committee nevertheless argues that it cannot be 
liable under ERISA because, consistent with the nature of ESOPs 
                                                           
0As we have explained, we would have reached the same result 
applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 
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themselves, it cannot be accountable for investing the assets 
solely in Statewide stock.  We turn to that argument now, which 
again requires a detailed inquiry into the standard of review 
over an ESOP fiduciary's decisions. 
 
4.  ESOPs and ERISA 
a.  General policies and the developed caselaw 
 ERISA contains specific provisions governing ESOPs. 
While fiduciaries of pension benefit plans generally must 
diversify investments of the plan assets "so as to minimize the 
risk of large losses," see section 1104(a)(1)(C), fiduciaries of 
ESOPS are exempted from this duty.  Specifically, "the 
diversification requirement . . . and the prudence requirement 
(only to the extent that it requires diversification) . . . is 
not violated by acquisition or holding of . . . qualifying 
employer securities . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).  In other 
words, under normal circumstances, ESOP fiduciaries cannot be 
taken to task for failing to diversify investments, regardless of 
how prudent diversification would be under the terms of an 
ordinary non-ESOP pension plan.  ESOPs also are exempted from 
ERISA's "strict prohibitions against dealing with a party in 
interest, and against self-dealing, that is, 'deal[ing] with the 
assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own account.'" 
Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 665 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing 29 
U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1)), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 979 (1993). 
 The reason for these specific rules arises out of the 
nature and purpose of ESOPs themselves.  "[E]mployee stock 
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ownership plan[s are] designed to invest primarily in qualifying 
employer securities."  29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)(A).  Thus, unlike 
the traditional pension plan governed by ERISA, ESOP assets 
generally are invested "in securities issued by [the plan's] 
sponsoring company," Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1458 
(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251, 104 S.Ct. 3533 
(1984).  In keeping with this, ESOPs, unlike pension plans, are 
not intended to guarantee retirement benefits, and indeed, by its 
very nature "an ESOP places employee retirement assets at much 
greater risk than does the typical diversified ERISA plan." 
Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d at 664.  The summary plan description 
in this case, for example, explicitly stated that the plan "does 
not provide for a guaranteed benefit at retirement."  App. 174. 
 Rather, ESOPs serve other purposes.  Under their 
original rationale, ESOPS were described "as . . . device[s] for 
expanding the national capital base among employees -- an 
effective merger of the roles of capitalist and worker."  Donovan 
v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d at 1458.  Thus, the concept of employee 
ownership constituted a goal in and of itself.  To accomplish 
this end, "Congress . . . enacted a number of laws designed to 
encourage employers to set up such plans."  Id.   The Tax Reform 
Act of 1976 was one of those statutes, and in passing it, 
Congress explicitly stated its concern that courts should refrain 
from erecting barriers that would interfere with that goal: 
'The Congress is deeply concerned that the 
objectives sought by [the series of laws 
encouraging ESOPs] will be made unattainable 
by regulations and rulings which treat 
employee stock ownership plans as 
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conventional retirement plans, which reduce 
the freedom of the employee trusts and 
employers to take the necessary steps to 
implement the plans, and which otherwise 
block the establishment and success of these 
plans.' 
 
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 803(h), 90 Stat. 
1590 (1976) (quoted in Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d at 1466 
n.24). 
 Notwithstanding all of this, ESOPs are covered by 
ERISA's stringent requirements, and except for a few select 
provisions like the ones we quote above, ESOP fiduciaries must 
act in accordance with the duties of loyalty and care.  In other 
words, "Congress expressly intended that the ESOP would be both 
an employee retirement benefit plan and a 'technique of corporate 
finance' that would encourage employee ownership."  Martin v. 
Feilen, 965 F.2d at 664 (quoting 129 Cong. Rec. S16629, S16636 
(Daily ed. Nov. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Long)).  ESOP 
fiduciaries must, then, wear two hats, and are "expected to 
administer ESOP investments consistent with the provisions of 
both a specific employee benefits plan and ERISA."  Kuper v. 
Quantum Chem. Corp., 852 F. Supp. at 1395. 
 All of this makes delineating the responsibilities of 
ESOP trustees difficult, because they "must satisfy the demands 
of Congressional policies that seem destined to collide." Donovan 
v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1466 (5th Cir. 1983) (footnotes 
omitted), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251, 104 S.Ct. 3533 (1984).  As 
the Cunningham court explained: 
On the one hand, Congress has repeatedly 
expressed its intent to encourage the 
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formation of ESOPs by passing legislation 
granting such plans favorable treatment, and 
has warned against judicial and 
administrative action that would thwart that 
goal.  Competing with Congress' expressed 
policy to foster the formation of ESOPs is 
the policy expressed in equally forceful 
terms in ERISA:  that of safeguarding the 
interests of participants in employee benefit 
plans by vigorously enforcing standards of 
fiduciary responsibility. 
 
Id.  See also Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d at 665 ("the special 
statutory rules applicable to ESOPs inevitably affect the 
fiduciary's duties under § 1104"); Kuper, 852 F. Supp. at 1394 
(quoting Cunningham).  So with the goals of ESOPs on the one 
hand, and ERISA's stringent fiduciary duties on the other, the 
courts' "task in interpreting the statute is to balance these 
concerns so that competent fiduciaries will not be afraid to 
serve, but without giving unscrupulous ones a license to steal." 
Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d at 1466.  The goals of the two 
statutes often serve consistent ends -- ensuring that the 
fiduciary acts in the interest of the plan -- and in those cases 
the nature of a plaintiff's claim will not create tension.  But 
when the plaintiff claims that an ESOP fiduciary violated its 
ERISA duties by continuing to invest in employer securities, the 
conflict becomes particularly stark. 
 Nevertheless, cases addressing the duties of ESOP 
fiduciaries in this area generally have allowed ERISA's strict 
standards to override the specific policies behind ESOPs.  In 
Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978), for example, an 
ESOP fiduciary argued that he was bound by both the terms of the 
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ESOP plan and ERISA itself to invest the plan assets in employer 
securities.  The court, relying extensively on the legislative 
history underlying ERISA, interpreted the statutory exception as 
only prohibiting per se liability based on failure to diversify. 
It justified this conclusion by reasoning that "the structure of 
the Act itself requires that in making an investment decision of 
whether or not a plan's assets should be invested in employer 
securities, an ESOP fiduciary, just as fiduciaries of other 
plans, is governed by the 'solely in the interest' and 'prudence' 
tests. . . ."  Id. at 459. 
 Other decisions are more specific and have held that 
notwithstanding ERISA's diversification provisions, an ESOP 
fiduciary must diversify if diversification is in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries.  The Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit has stated: 
[T]he requirement of prudence in investment 
decisions and the requirement that all 
acquisitions be solely in the interest of 
plan participants continue to apply.  The 
investment decisions of a profit sharing 
plan's fiduciary are subject to the closest 
scrutiny under the prudent person rule, in 
spite of the 'strong policy and preference in 
favor of investment in employer stock.' 
 
Fink v. National Sav. and Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 955-56 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).  And in an opinion heavily relied 
upon by Moench and his amici, a district court in this circuit 
has held that the ERISA provisions exempting ESOP fiduciaries 
from the duty to diversify "merely entail that 'acquisition of 
employer securities . . . does not, in and of itself, violate any 
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of the absolute prohibitions of ERISA.'"  Canale v. Yegen, 782 F. 
Supp. 963, 967 (D.N.J. 1992) (quoting Fink, 772 F.2d at 955), 
reargument denied in part, granted in part, 789 F. Supp. 147 
(D.N.J. 1992).  Rather, the court continued, "the allegation that 
[an ESOP] administrator has failed to prudently diversify plan 
assets invested exclusively in the stock of the beneficiaries' 
employer can state a claim for breach of fiduciary duties under 
ERISA."  Id. at 967-68. 
 Notwithstanding the fact that none of these decisions 
specifically delineate a standard of review, Moench and his amici 
read these cases as requiring that a court not be deferential 
when reviewing an ESOP fiduciary's actions in investing in 
employer securities.  There are numerous problems with their 
argument.  First, by subjecting an ERISA fiduciary's decision to 
invest in employer stock to strict judicial scrutiny, we 
essentially would render meaningless the ERISA provision 
excepting ESOPs from the duty to diversify.  Moreover, we would 
risk transforming ESOPs into ordinary pension benefit plans, 
which then would frustrate Congress' desire to encourage employee 
ownership.  After all, why would an employer establish an ESOP if 
its compliance with the purpose and terms of the plan could 
subject it to strict judicial second-guessing?  Further still, 
basic principles of trust law require that the interpretation of 
the terms of the trust be controlled by the settlor's intent. 
That principle is not well served in the long run by ignoring the 
general intent behind such plans in favor of giving beneficiaries 
the maximum opportunities to recover their losses. 
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 In short, the sheer existence of ESOPs demonstrates 
that there is some value in employee ownership per se, even 
though participants inevitably run some risk in terms of their 
financial gain.  Therefore, the policies behind ERISA's rules 
governing pension benefit plans cannot simply override the goals 
of ESOPs, and courts must find a way for the competing concerns 
to coexist.  Indeed, the position taken by Moench and the 
Secretary of Labor leaves numerous questions unanswered:  How is 
an ESOP fiduciary to determine when diversification is in the 
best interest of the beneficiaries?  Is the fiduciary always to 
seek the return-maximizing investment, or is there some non-
tangible loyalty interest served by retaining ESOP investments in 
employer stock?  Additionally, to what extent should ESOPs be 
considered retirement plans, notwithstanding the qualification 
contained in most of them, including Statewide's, that they are 
not designed to guarantee retirement income?  We are uneasy with 
the answers Moench and the Secretary would give to these 
questions.  Both seem ready and willing to sacrifice the policies 
behind ESOPs and employee ownership in order to make "ESOP 
fiduciaries virtual guarantors of the financial success of the 
[ESOP] plan."  Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d at 666.  That we 
cannot, should not and will not do.   
 In this regard, we point out that the participants in 
the plan effectively became investors in Statewide and thus 
should have expected to run risks inherent in that role.  The 
Statewide plan was voluntary and the summary plan description 
provides that "[e]ach individual Employee's account will 
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experience gains or losses according to the performance of the 
investments held by the Plan.  The primary investment of the Plan 
shall be Statewide Bancorp Common Stock."  App. 174.  Therefore, 
the participants should have recognized that the value of their 
interests was dependent on Statewide's performance. 
 
b.  Developing a standard 
 We again look to trust law for guidance in determining 
the standard of review.  We can formulate a proper standard of 
review of an ESOP fiduciary's investment decisions by recognizing 
that when an ESOP is created, it becomes simply a trust under 
which the trustee is directed to invest the assets primarily in 
the stock of a single company.  More than that, the trust serves 
a purpose explicitly approved and encouraged by Congress. 
Therefore, as a general matter, "ESOP fiduciaries should not be 
subject to breach-of-duty liability for investing plan assets in 
the manner and for the . . . purposes that Congress intended." 
Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d at 670.  And while trustees -- of both 
ordinary trusts and pension benefit plans -- are under a duty to 
"diversify the investments of the trust," see Restatement (Third) 
§ 227(b), that duty is waivable by the terms of the trust. 
Section 227(d) ("The trustee's duties under this Section are 
subject to the rule . . . dealing with contrary investment 
provisions of a trust or statute.").  Seen in light of these 
principles, the provision in ERISA exempting ESOPs from the duty 
to diversify is simply a statutory acknowledgement of the terms 
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of ESOP trusts.  And the common law of trusts in fact guides us 
in this difficult area. 
 The Restatement of Trusts provides that in investing 
trust funds, "the trustee . . . has a duty to the beneficiaries 
to conform to the terms of the trust directing . . . investments 
by the trustee."  Restatement (Third) § 228.  Thus, "[a]s a 
general rule a trustee can properly make investments in such 
properties and in such manner as expressly or impliedly 
authorized by the terms of the trust."  Id. comment (d). However, 
trust law distinguishes between two types of directions: the 
trustee either may be mandated or permitted to make a particular 
investment.  If the trust requires the fiduciary to invest in a 
particular stock, the trustee must comply unless "compliance 
would be impossible . . . or illegal" or a deviation is otherwise 
approved by the court.  Id. comment (e).  When the instrument 
only allows or permits a particular investment, "[t]he fiduciary 
must still exercise care, skill, and caution in making decisions 
to acquire or retain the investment."  Id. comment (f). 
 In a case such as this, in which the fiduciary is not 
absolutely required to invest in employer securities but is more 
than simply permitted to make such investments, while the 
fiduciary presumptively is required to invest in employer 
securities, there may come a time when such investments no longer 
serve the purpose of the trust, or the settlor's intent. 
Therefore fiduciaries should not be immune from judicial inquiry, 
as a directed trustee essentially is, but also should not be 
subject to the strict scrutiny that would be exercised over a 
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trustee only authorized to make a particular investment.  Thus, a 
court should not undertake a de novo review of the fiduciary's 
actions similar to the review applied in Struble.  Rather, the 
most logical result is that the fiduciary's decision to continue 
investing in employer securities should be reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion. 
 In light of the analysis detailed above, keeping in 
mind the purpose behind ERISA and the nature of ESOPs themselves, 
we hold that in the first instance, an ESOP fiduciary who invests 
the assets in employer stock is entitled to a presumption that it 
acted consistently with ERISA by virtue of that decision. 
However, the plaintiff may overcome that presumption by 
establishing that the fiduciary abused its discretion by 
investing in employer securities.   
 In attempting to rebut the presumption, the plaintiff 
may introduce evidence that "owing to circumstances not known to 
the settlor and not anticipated by him [the making of such 
investment] would defeat or substantially impair the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust."  Restatement 
(Second) § 227 comment g.0  As in all trust cases, in reviewing 
the fiduciary's actions, the court must be governed by the intent 
behind the trust -- in other words, the plaintiff must show that 
the ERISA fiduciary could not have believed reasonably that 
continued adherence to the ESOP's direction was in keeping with 
                                                           
0This quote derives from the Second Restatement, though the 
section we quote has been amended by the Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts. 
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the settlor's expectations of how a prudent trustee would 
operate.  In determining whether the plaintiff has overcome the 
presumption, the courts must recognize that if the fiduciary, in 
what it regards as an exercise of caution, does not maintain the 
investment in the employer's securities, it may face liability 
for that caution, particularly if the employer's securities 
thrive.  See Kuper, 852 F. Supp. at 1395, ("defendants who 
attempted to diversify its ESOP assets conceivably could confront 
liability for failure to comply with plan documents"). 
 In considering whether the presumption that an ESOP 
fiduciary who has invested in employer securities has acted 
consistently with ERISA has been rebutted, courts should be 
cognizant that as the financial state of the company 
deteriorates, ESOP fiduciaries who double as directors of the 
corporation often begin to serve two masters.  And the more 
uncertain the loyalties of the fiduciary, the less discretion it 
has to act.  Indeed, "'[w]hen a fiduciary has dual loyalties, the 
prudent person standard requires that he make a careful and 
impartial investigation of all investment decisions.'" Martin v. 
Feilen, 965 F.2d at 670 (citation omitted).  As the Feilen court 
stated in the context of a closely held corporation: 
[T]his case graphically illustrates the risk 
of liability that ESOP fiduciaries bear when 
they act with dual loyalties without 
obtaining the impartial guidance of a 
disinterested outside advisor to the plan. 
Because the potential for disloyal self-
dealing and the risk to the beneficiaries 
from undiversified investing are inherently 
great when insiders act for a closely held 
corporation's ESOP, courts should look 
closely at whether the fiduciaries 
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investigated alternative actions and relied 
on outside advisors before implementing a 
challenged transaction. 
 
Id. at 670-71.  And, if the fiduciary cannot show that he or she 
impartially investigated the options, courts should be willing to 
find an abuse of discretion. 
 When all is said and done, this is precisely the 
argument Moench makes in this case:  that the precipitous decline 
in the price of Statewide stock, as well as the Committee's 
knowledge of its impending collapse and its members' own 
conflicted status, changed circumstances to such an extent that 
the Committee properly could effectuate the purposes of the trust 
only by deviating from the trust's direction or by contracting 
out investment decisions to an impartial outsider. 
 Because the record is incomplete, we cannot determine 
whether the Committee is entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, 
we will remand the matter to the district court for further 
proceedings in which the record may be developed and the case may 
be judged on the basis of the principles we set forth.0 
 
  D.  Failure to bring derivative action 
 Moench and the Secretary of Labor appear to argue that 
the district court erred by failing to address Moench's claim 
                                                           
0Moench contends that he raised a number of other fiduciary 
breaches before the district court, independent of the 
Committee's investment in Statewide stock.  Furthermore, Moench 
contended at oral argument that the Committee engaged in self-
dealing prohibited by ERISA.  This opinion is limited to the 
issues discussed; it is up to the district court to determine 
whether these other claims are adequately plead, and if so, how 
to proceed with them. 
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that the Committee violated ERISA by failing to file a claim 
against Statewide's directors on behalf of the ESOP. 
 Actually, Moench's argument is somewhat unclear.  In 
his statement of issues presented, Moench asks whether "ERISA 
[is] violated when pension plan administrators exonerate 
themselves of personal liability to the plan by excluding the 
plan from participation in the settlement of a class action 
securities fraud suit against some of the plan administrators, 
and by letting limitations run out without investigating the 
wisdom of the plan bringing its own securities fraud suit?"0  Br. 
at 1.  However, the corresponding portion of the brief's argument 
section is entitled "Failure to have the ESOP pursue any 
securities fraud claim was a prejudicial and actionable breach of 
fiduciary duty."  Br. at 24 (emphasis added).  In that section, 
Moench argues that "the defendant[s] . . . clearly and 
unequivocally had a duty to pursue a derivative action against 
three of their own number as well as the plan sponsor, whom the 
members served as corporate directors."  Br. at 27.  For his 
part, the Secretary of Labor makes a different, more general 
argument:  "The district court did not address the plaintiff's 
claim that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties under 
ERISA by failing to take steps on the ESOP's behalf as 
                                                           
0The record shows that a shareholder's derivative action was 
filed against Statewide, Lerner v. Statewide Bancorp., Civ. No. 
90-1552, which named, among others, three of the defendants in 
this suit.  That action eventually settled, and the ESOP was 
excluded from the settlement. 
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shareholder to remedy corporate fiduciary breaches committed by 
FNBTR's directors."  Amicus Br. at 23. 
 The confused arguments urged on this appeal, and the 
conflicting descriptions of what was raised in the district 
court, is not surprising, considering that Moench made an 
entirely different argument before the district court.  The issue 
of the Committee's duty to take affirmative legal action was 
raised below only as part of a still different argument that 
"[t]here are numerous questions of fact surrounding defendants' 
conflict of interest."  Plaintiff's Mem. of Law in Opp. to Def. 
Mot. for Sum. Jud. at 25.  Moench argued in the district court 
that "the defendants, having knowledge that the bank was 
fraudulently understating the true extent of its financial 
difficulties, had a duty to act on this knowledge, even if it was 
not public knowledge.  Moreover, this duty may have included a 
duty to bring a derivative action on behalf of the ESOP, even if 
it meant suing themselves as directors."  Id. at 29 (emphasis 
added).  It appears from a fair reading of his brief in the 
district court -- though it is by no means crystal clear -- that 
Moench was urging that the Committee breached its ERISA duties by 
failing either to resign as ESOP trustees or to assign the 
investment decisions to an independent outside source.  Thus, 
Moench concluded the conflict of interest section in the brief 
below by stating:  "It is submitted that after receipt of the 
March 1990 OCC report, and the filing of the Lerner action, these 
two duties [of director and ESOP fiduciary] became 
irreconcilable."  Id. at 30. 
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 At any rate, our resolution of the issues discussed 
above, which requires that we vacate the grant of summary 
judgment and hence resurrects Moench's complaint, makes it 
unnecessary for us to reach this issue.  Upon remand, Moench may 
seek to file a motion to amend his complaint to make clear 
precisely what he is arguing on this score.0 
III.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the district 
court's order of September 21, 1994, granting summary judgment on 
counts 1, 2, and 4 of the amended complaint, and will remand the 
matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
                                                           
0We stress that the standard of review we apply over an ESOP 
fiduciary's investment decisions does not necessarily apply over 
a claim that an ESOP fiduciary failed to take action to protect 
the ESOP assets.  If the district court reaches this "failure to 
sue" issue on remand, it should determine in the first instance 
the appropriate standard of review.  In making that 
determination, the court should consider whether Struble 
controls. 
